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The Legal Status of NGOs in International Governance and its 
Relevance for the Legitimacy of International Organizations 
ABSTRACT 
This working paper introduces the concept of legal personality of non-state actors as an 
indicator of the democratic legitimacy of international organizations (IOs). 
Globalization has led to changes in statehood which are reflected in new democratic 
forms of participation and new expectations and attitudes towards political institutions. 
This also affects international politics in that international organizations are questioned 
with regard to their own legitimacy. In this context, normatively and empirically based 
policy proposals alike tend to suggest an increased role of new actors, mostly civil 
society organizations (CSOs) or NGOs, in overcoming the legitimacy deficit of IOs. 
However, if participation of non-state actors in international governance is to be 
effective, efficient and have a meaningful and lasting effect, it requires institutional 
rights and duties – and with it legal personality. Thus, legal personality of non-state 
actors can be taken as a minimum safeguarding clause for surmounting the legitimacy 
deficit of international organizations (normative approach). It can also be used as a 
helpful analytical framework for organizing empirical data on the participation of these 
actors in IOs (empirical approach). This working paper evaluates the legal rights and 
duties of NGOs in their cooperation with more than 30 international organizations and 
seeks to assess whether this implies that they have acquired legal personality and which 
quality this personality takes on. Such a comparative paper is a novelty in both political 
science and international law. By combining perspectives from two disciplines, this 
working paper illustrates the intrinsic empirical and theory-building value of 
(international) positive law in political science. 
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The Legal Status of NGOs in International Governance and its 
Relevance for the Legitimacy of International Organizations 
INTRODUCTION 
Political science primarily is concerned with actors. Actors are those persons (individual 
actors) or organizations (collective actors) which, in the broadest sense, participate 
through their actions in the decision-making of a political entity, normally the State. The 
theory of International Relations (IR) in specific is shaped by differing focuses on the 
"international system" and its principal actors, namely the State, international organiza-
tions (IOs), but more recently also non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trans-
national enterprises or even individuals. The term of "actor" is used in a way to encom-
pass all those agents who matter for (international) politics, and the question is about 
what the primary actors are in international relations, how they can be described, how 
they interact with each other and in which way they shape world politics. The notion of 
"person" rarely appears in international theory, and if, both terms are used inter-
changeably. In this sense, an international actor, such as the State or an international 
organization, is treated as if it is an individual – or a person – with some attributes this 
personhood would bring with it (mostly intentions, but also beliefs and desires). 
This foremost realist view of actors in world politics is questioned by others, mostly 
liberals, who take physicalism as their starting point and argue that only individuals are 
real. This liberal "reductionist" view is meant to set up barriers against challenges to 
liberalism (fascism, genocide, etc.). However, there is a strand of social-constructivist 
international theorizing which tries to reconcile liberal physicalism in a non-reductive 
sense with the realist view of the State by grounding the latter explanatorily and norma-
tively in real – and not "as if" – personhood. Thus, starting out from an article written 
by Arnold Wolfers in 19591, Alexander Wendt (Wendt 1987) introduced the agent-
structure problem into IR theory and picked up the notion of the state as a psychological 
person in the late 1980s. Having investigated into state theory in social and political 
sciences, he developed his Social Theory of International Politics (Wendt 1999), in 
which he argues that the State is a real actor with – even though only some – anthropo-
morphic attributes, such as (corporate) intentionality2. The useful concept of state per-
sonhood is thus retained without compromising on liberalism or, in other words, by a 
non-metaphysical, physicalist way to justify liberalism. In sum, however, Wendt's So-
                                                 
1  Published in Theoretical Aspects of International Relations. This article then was made chapter one of Discord 
and Collaboration with only minor changes in 1962; see Wolfers (1965). 
2  See also a round-table which took place at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association in 
new Orleans, LA, USA; Jackson (2004) and Wendt (2004). 
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cial Theory did not change the inter-changeability of the terms of "actor" and "person" 
in IR theory. 
Far away from this discussion, international jurists engage in a debate around the 
same notions, but with a completely different meaning. In legal theory, the term of "(le-
gal) person" or "subject" is the concept used to describe the main actors – those who 
matter – in (international) law. A (legal) person is an entity capable of possessing (in-
ternational) rights and duties, whereas an actor does not necessarily have such a capac-
ity. Legal personality thus is a normative concept with real-world legal consequences, 
rather than a metaphoric transformation of realities. We do not speak of personhood in 
this case, but of personality. The debate around those notions is triggered off by devel-
opments towards the emergence of new subjects in international law, such as individu-
als, trans-national enterprises or non-governmental organizations. The State, though, as 
the main subject of international law, was and unquestionably continues to be an inter-
national subject or person, without using the term of actor instead. With regard to non-
governmental organizations, however, a debate evolves – though separately within dif-
ferent national legal systems –, around the question whether or not those organizations 
might qualify as legal persons in international law, or whether they might be treated as 
"simple" actors3. As one author (Dupuy 2003: 262) has recently suggested, there seems 
to be a dichotomy between "ancient" and "modern" international lawyers, or between 
Europe and America, with regard to the classification of NGOs. I would add that it also 
is a rift between lawyers trained in different legal systems, namely, the continental and 
the Anglo-Saxon (common law) tradition respectively. In continental systems in general 
and in the French system more specifically, on the one hand, there is a split between 
different disciplines, namely political science and law, whereas on the other hand, we 
confront a more sociologically informed English legal tradition (Mosler 1962: 12). In 
any case, it is not only a linguistic, generational, national, and cultural problem. 
Whereas "old Europe" keeps firmly attached to those agents which alone seem to qual-
ify for legal personality (States and international organizations) at the expense of con-
sidering the increased political weight of new actors, "new America" tries to resituate 
international law in its social context, at the expense of striving for a sound legal analy-
sis embedded in legal positivism. The solution may lie in a concentration on the legal 
statute of participation of NGOs in international organizations (Dupuy 2003: 275-277)4. 
                                                 
3  See also below. 
4  Other proposals to forge links between disciplines are less convincing. Thus, Noortmann proposed to focus re-
search on NGOs as a framework of reference rather than making them the subject of research itself. He suggested 
studying the contribution of NGOs to the legal determination of customary international norms. However, how 
should they contribute to the interpretation of international law in a legally authoritative way without having any 
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ACTORS OR PERSONS – DOES IT MATTER? 
This having been said, the question remains whether, and in which sense, this legal dis-
cussion might matter for political science in general and IR theory in specific. Does it 
make any difference if NGOs are considered as international legal persons, as actors, or 
even as something in between? My point is that it does. The reason why this might be 
the case can be found in the debate on the (missing) legitimacy of international organi-
zations which was instigated within the last decade. Expressed mostly in descriptive, 
rather than normative or prescriptive5, terms, be it in the realms of political theory (Dahl 
1994; Held 1995; Scharpf 1999) and law (Gramlich 2003), or more powerfully in the 
streets through "civil disobedience" and far less visible in national parliaments, this de-
bate mainly is about societal acceptance of international organizations and the (missing) 
belief in their legitimacy on the part of the ruled-over. However, as Zürn, basing himself 
on Lipset (Lipset 1960), eloquently pointed to, "empirical belief in the legitimacy of an 
institution closely depends on the normative validity of a political order" (Zürn 2004: 
261). Thus, an empirical or descriptive grasp on the question of international legitimacy 
cannot operate without being grounded in a normative judgement on the rightfulness of 
a social order, or at least in a prescriptive concept on the rightful grounds which help 
this order to be labelled "legitimate". This might be the reason for the emergence of 
more and more normative philosophical claims looking for alternatives to the present 
international state of affairs in order to resolve the legitimacy problem of international 
organizations (Habermas 1998; Schmalz-Bruns 1999; Höffe 2002). However, the re-
versed case is valid likewise, that is, an assessment of the democratic legitimacy of in-
ternational organizations cannot only be philosophical, but also must be social scientific 
and empirical (Moravcsik 2004). 
Be they exclusively normative-prescriptive or predominantly empirical-descriptive, 
approaches which include proposals how to overcome the legitimacy deficit in interna-
tional organizations increasingly tend to refer to an increased role of new actors, first of 
all of civil society at large (Falk 1995; Nanz and Steffek 2004; Scholte 2004) or of in-
ternational parliamentary institutions in specific (Blichner 2000; Falk and Strauss 2001; 
Kissling 2001). The roles assigned to those "new" actors resort to the necessity of their 
increased "access to" and "participation in decision-making", to their task of "monitor-
ing compliance", of "reviewing decisions taken", and of "seeking redress for mistakes 
                                                                                                                                               
legal status? And in fact, Noortman rightly refers only to those entities unquestionably disposing of personality in 
international law. He thus unconsciously takes reference to the most rigid form of the personality concept (see be-
low), looking at the normative power of NGOs and the assumed transformation of international law into a law of 
nations; Noortmann (2002: 38-39). 
5  For a clarification of the terms normative, empirical, descriptive, and prescriptive, see Steffek (2003). 
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and harms", but also to catchwords such as the contribution of civil society and parlia-
mentary actors to the "public transparency" or "accountability" of an IO (Held 2004; 
Scholte 2004: 217). Looking closer at these demands, all of them involve institutional 
rights on the part of these actors, if the requested procedures are intended to operate 
effectively, efficiently and to take a lasting effect. However, especially NGOs6 are also 
challenged and examined with regard to their own legitimacy7. This points to the as-
sumption that the concept of international legitimacy cannot simply refer to rights of 
new actors without looking for corresponding duties, at least if those actors want to play 
a role in the process of holding IOs accountable (Scholte 2004: 232). 
Thus, (legal) rights and duties, and consequently legal personality, of these new in-
ternational actors do matter. They can be taken as a minimal safeguarding clause for 
overcoming the legitimacy deficit of international organizations, be it under the norma-
tive claim or with regard to prescriptive policy proposals stemming from empirical re-
search. This even is valid in connection with a specific normative postulate within de-
liberative theory, namely, legitimate governance through the mediation of a public sphe-
re. Without access of the public to information, without some interaction between civil 
society and decision-making bodies, a discursive public sphere cannot be informed 
through the transmission belt of civil society networks – and hence cannot constitute a 
legitimizing force for international organizations. Thus, Nanz rightly acknowledges that 
for this legitimizing postulate to work out, institutional arrangements are necessary in 
order to ensure the accountability of democratic decision-making bodies (Nanz 2003: 
78). 
In consequence, "[o]fficial rules of engagement can have […] enabling […] effects 
for civil society activities" (Scholte 2004: 226), but also disabling ones in the case of 
prohibitions or non-existence of rules. If non-governmental organizations or inter-
parliamentary assemblies could be said to have a certain legal stand in international law, 
some minimal preconditions for legitimate governing might be guaranteed. This does 
not mean that legal rights and duties would dispense with the necessity of them being 
applied or implemented (on the part of the rulers), nor of them being accepted as bind-
ing and generally being respected (on the part of the ruled-over), but without their mere 
existence, there is no guarantee for a non-arbitrary involvement of civil society or par-
liamentarians, hence an equal opportunity for all. The door would be open to inconsis-
                                                 
6  NGOs are often seen as representing civil society at large or are taken as a proxy for measuring civil society input 
in international fora. In some contexts, the notion of civil society organization (CSO) is used instead, often with a 
somewhat larger meaning. In the following, I apply the term of NGOs in its proxy function, encompassing as 
such also CSOs; see also note 10. 
7  Beisheim (1997), Edwards (2000), Kovach, Neligan, et al. (2003), Held (2004: 385). 
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tency, subjectivity, chance, and the undermining of the weak, in short, to arbitrariness8. 
Thus, rights and duties here are a de jure safeguarding clause for equal de facto legiti-
mizing capabilities of both, the legitimizing new international actors and the organiza-
tion which searches for legitimacy of its international order through according these 
rights and duties. Therefore, we might take the personality concept as a starting point 
for operationalizing normative legitimacy claims or prescriptive policy proposals in 
order to juxtapose them to empirical real world settings. At the same time, the concept 
might provide a helpful minimal framework of analysis for empirical data on the par-
ticipation of new actors in international organizations. This points to an intrinsic empiri-
cal and theory-building value (international) positive law can take on in political sci-
ence. 
The research project in the context of which this paper has been elaborated has a 
normative concept of deliberative democracy at its outset9. Deliberation, it is claimed, 
can enhance the legitimacy of rule making in international organizations. The focus here 
is on the increasing role of civil society in international policy-making and its influence 
through the mediating function of NGOs10. In order to assess the existing democratic 
quality of decision-making within IOs, the normative concept is operationalized and 
made accessible to empirical research. Four criteria are proposed in this context, 
namely, access (of NGOs to deliberation and decision-making), transparency (of the 
policy-making process), responsiveness (of decision-makers and their agendas to con-
cerns of NGOs) and inclusion (of all relevant NGO concerns) (Nanz and Steffek 2005). 
The first two as well as in some way also the fourth criteria hinge upon formal institu-
tional procedures, and thus on legal rights and duties, whereas the third, responsiveness, 
introduces an element of institutional learning through deliberation. The first two pro-
cedural criteria are defined as sine qua non condition for the third criterion, i. e. for in-
stitutional learning, and thus constitute a sort of "safeguarding clause" for a full account 
of democratic legitimacy. 
The project's design foresees - as the last methodological step of what is essentially a 
qualitative research approach - simple ordinal scaling of the different empirical findings. 
                                                 
8  This is specifically valid for informal ways of influencing international decision-making. I do not preclude that 
those ways, e. g. lobbying, sometimes might even be more successful; Paech (2001: 11). However, they are open 
only to the strong and powerful, which discards the democratic postulate of equal opportunity. 
9  For the project proposal, see http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de/download/de/forschung/B5_2003_projekt 
antrag.pdf. 
10  In the research project, we use the term NGOs in a wider sense, encompassing civil society organizations (CSOs) 
in general. By those CSOs we mean non-governmental, non-profit organisations that have a clearly stated pur-
pose, legal personality (in national law), and pursue their goals in non-violent ways; Nanz and Steffek (2005: 2). 
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However, scaling has to be done for each criterion or indicator separately in order to 
avoid distortions through computing. This paper proposes to examine the procedural 
preconditions altogether11 by taking on a legal analytical approach. This might have the 
disadvantage of not being able to attribute NGO rights and duties to different normative 
criteria. However, it could provide an alternative methodological approach, which de-
livers an encompassing and fine-tuned picture of the empirical existence of precondi-
tions for legitimacy within different IO settings whilst preventing it at the same time 
from falling into the pitfalls of misinterpretation ensuing from quantitative measure-
ments. Moreover, it adds the criterion of NGO legitimacy through the inclusion of NGO 
duties. One further clarification yet has to be made: this alternative approach does not 
cover the criterion of responsiveness of international organizations to NGO concerns, 
i. e. the actual impact of NGO input, including the justification of IOs with regard to 
acceptance or dismissal of NGO claims. Thus, I do not claim to draw conclusions in 
relation to the legitimacy of international organizations, but rather concerning the exis-
tence of minimal safeguards for the fulfilment of such legitimacy by IOs. What I pro-
pose is hence an analysis of empirical data with regard to the degree of international 
legal status of NGOs within different IOs - comparable to investigations of the status of 
inter-parliamentary assemblies in international law (Kissling forthcoming: chap. 2.2) - 
as an analytical framework for answering the question of existence of minimal proce-
dural safeguarding clauses for the legitimacy of international organizations. 
CRITERIA OF NGO PERSONALITY 
Lawyers in general tend to approach a certain subject by first defining precisely the 
terms used in their analysis. So do international lawyers when speaking about interna-
tional personality12. What is meant is "das Bezogensein eines Subjektes auf eine bes-
timmte Rechtsordnung" (Anzilotti 1929: 89). A subject of international law then is an 
addressee of international legal norms of a specified positive legal order13. However, 
here the definitional consent of international lawyers ends. Even though criteria of in-
ternational personality have been singled out and precisely formulated especially with 
                                                 
11  To some extent, I also include rights and duties in this study which relate to the fourth element, i. e. inclusion 
(positive empowerment of most disadvantaged stakeholders), when it comes to an IO's proactive NGO policy, e. 
g. with regard to financing of NGOs. However, since those rights and obligations do not constitute preconditions 
for democratic legitimacy per se, this approach is not implemented in extensu; see below. 
12  Whereas the concept is usually referred to as "personality" ("personnalité", "Rechtspersönlichkeit"), the addressee 
of the concept preferably is named a "subject" ("sujet", "Rechtssubjekt"). For the distinction between subjects and 
persons see below. 
13  Inductive approach (prevailing opinion). For a distinction between deductive and inductive approaches, see Hem-
pel (1999: 56-71). 
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regard to new, non-State subjects in subsidiary sources of international law, such as 
judicial decisions14 and teachings of prominent international lawyers, legal doctrine has 
never agreed upon the exact combination of criteria which would sketch out the scope 
of the concept. Grosso modo, we can distinguish five different criteria which are pro-
posed alternatively or cumulatively. When I speak of the legal status of an entity in in-
ternational law in this paper, I refer to one or more of those criteria, without, however, 
being bound by a certain combination. For some, for example, it suffices for an entity to 
be called a legal subject to be the addressee of one or more rights15. In this view, every 
human person would be a subject of international law in the sense that it is the ad-
dressee of international human rights norms. Others proffer to add alternatively or addi-
tionally legal duties to the requested criteria (Hailbronner 2001: 169; Epping 2004: 55). 
However, in both cases, rights and duties alike have to be conferred directly (Nguyen 
Quoc, Daillier et al. 2002: 403), i. e. not through the transmission belt of an intermedi-
ary, such as the legal order of a State16. Another version is to include in the above-
mentioned list of criteria that of having the capacity to maintain the accorded rights by 
bringing international claims (Brownlie 2003: 57)17. Lato sensu, the procedural exten-
sion of this capacity to defend its own rights encompasses a capacity to act in its own 
                                                 
14  See the Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 
1949: 174. With regard to the United Nations, the Court used the criteria of "capable of possessing international 
rights and duties" and the "capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims"; 179. 
15  Some distinguish here between the capability ("suitable candidate") of an entity to possess legal rights (and du-
ties) and the de jure conferment of those rights to the corresponding entity; see Brownlie (2003) or the Advisory 
Opinion of the I.C.J., ibid.). I do not insist on this distinction since capability is hardly acknowledged for nascent 
cases of personality and what - in my view - counts in the end from a legal viewpoint is the definite conferment of 
rights (and duties). Capability may thus only be helpful when distinguishing between general subjects of interna-
tional law and those with a limited personality. 
16  Here the dispute starts with regard to human rights: Are they directly conferred or only through inclusion in a 
national legal order? I suggest that they are directly conferred, but what mostly deprives the addressed individuals 
of a certain level of international personality is the missing possibility to bring international human rights claims; 
see below. 
17  See also note 14. It has to be added that there is a doctrinal controversy about the necessity of existence of certain 
legal capacities (minimal functions) in order to claim international personality. Thus, some argue e. g. that the ca-
pacity to conclude international treaties, the capacity to establish diplomatic relations, and the capacity to be held 
responsible are minimal conditions for legal status; Dominicé (1996). As this seems to be a minority position; 
Mosler (2000: 714), I take the stand that the only minimal capacity for the quality as person is that of bringing in-
ternational claims since otherwise, there is no way to meaningfully enforce rights and duties and to possess full 
capacity to act; differing Hempel (1999: 70-71). 
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favour, not only before a court, but also before administrative instances in charge of 
controlling the implementation of international norms (Dupuy 2003: 265-266). Another 
strand adds another criterion, namely the necessity of an entity to be hold to account 
before an international court, corollary of the existence of international duties (Cahier 
1985: 93-94). The Restatement of the Law Third, The Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States seems to take this second group of criteria as a condition for calling the 
entities concerned international persons. Entities that "have only rights and obligations" 
ought to be called subjects (The American Law Institute 1987: 70-71). I will use this 
linguistic distinction in the following when elaborating on a gradual legal approach to 
international personality. Finally, a minority of international lawyers assume that to 
speak about personality, an entity has to possess the capacity to create international law, 
or at least to participate decisively in its creation - directly or indirectly through repre-
sentatives -, and thus to dispose of so-called "normative power" (Stoecker 2000: 90)18. 
Turning to the specific case of NGOs, most authors of law (Verdross and Simma 
1984: 251; Klein 2001: 279; Dupuy 2002: 27-28) and politics (Martens 2003) reject the 
idea of legal status of those groups. However, dismissal of legal personality of those 
entities often occurs prematurely, failing any in-depth legal-empirical evaluation. First 
of all, we have to keep in mind the dictum of the International Court of Justice that 
"[t]he subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or 
in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the commu-
nity"19. Moreover, the question of whether NGOs possess international personality in-
trinsically is linked to the comprehension we have of the term (Stoecker 2000: 89). Hav-
ing taken a decision about which concept of personality we apply, a careful investiga-
tion has to search for its correspondence to real world settings with regard to the life and 
activities of NGOs. This is the basis on which some authors recently took the stand that 
NGOs have acquired legal status in international law. Thus, some, mostly German 
speaking lawyers begin to talk about partial personality20. Others admit a certain interna-
tional legal status without attributing international personality21. 
                                                 
18  Legal status hence in no way depends on the existence of a legal definition or on a general circumscription of 
rights and duties of an entity in, or its creation through international law; Mosler (1962: 41 and 45), even though 
those circumstances undoubtedly would do away with some uncertainties and would greatly enhance general ap-
plication of the concept to a specific entity. With regard to NGOs, attempts have been made - so far unsuccess-
fully - to progressively develop the legal status of NGOs through treaty law; see Dahm, Delbrück, et al. (2002: 
233), and Wiederkehr (1987: 753). 
19  I.C.J. Reports 1949: 178. 
20  Hobe (1999), Nowrot (1999: 614, 631, and 635), Bleckmann (2001: 518), Riedinger (2001: 320-321), Dahm, 
Delbrück, et al. (2002: 240-242), Hummer (2004: 241) Hempel classifies the personality of NGOs as derived per-
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However, further clarifications have to be made with regard to NGO international 
personality. It is clear that NGOs, in the case we attribute legal personality to them, can 
never be considered original subjects - a status which solely is reserved to States. Since 
they derive their personality - if ever - from other international subjects (States or IOs), 
they can only take on the status of secondary - or derived - subjects. Moreover, as 
Martens rightly acknowledges (Martens 2003: 19), there is no general (global) recogni-
tion of NGOs (of their rights/duties and of their legal status in general) in international 
law, that is in treaty or customary international law22. Instead, the status of NGOs differs 
from IO to IO. In this sense, we can speak of a legal status of NGOs solely within a par-
tial - or functional - international legal order or of functional personality targeted to-
wards NGO tasks in relation to a specific IO. In this context, it might make a difference 
if IOs recognize NGOs through primary international law which sets up their legal order 
(i. e. their founding treaty or other primary international law sources) or through corre-
sponding secondary international rules, namely, their derived legal order (mostly stat-
utes and resolutions). The latter would bestow NGOs with simply indirect interna-
tional personality, whereas the first also would give them direct international per-
sonality. However, indirect personality might become a direct one when it is contained 
in soft law which gradually evolves into customary international law through practice 
reaffirmed by opinio iuris23. Moreover, since they in no way are the main subjects 
                                                                                                                                               
sonality; Hempel (1999: 190-192). See also note 23. For an early expression of this view see Kaiser (1961: 614), 
and more carefully also Mosler (1962: 25 and 45 (indirect inclusion of NGOs in the international legal order)). 
The latter also gives a detailed analysis of the principal capacity of the international legal order to include other 
international subjects, e. g. what is today called NGOs (esp. 3-5 and 39). For a more extensive view on NGO per-
sonality see Lador-Lederer (1963). 
21  Lagoni (1991: 869-870), Rechenberg (1997: 617), Stoecker (2000: 98). 
22  As States try to avoid conferring group rights in general, they all the more circumvent speaking of NGOs rights 
and duties in hard and even soft law. Thus, the recent Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, 
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (Annex to UN GA Res. A/RES/53/144 of 9 December 1998) perpetuates the old language of former 
human rights law by bestowing rights and duties only to "everyone", that is the individual, and acknowledges 
NGOs merely with reference to their important role and responsibility in the human rights context. On the other 
hand, the only general (regional) treaty dealing with NGO status, namely, the European Convention on the Rec-
ognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organisations of 24 April 1986 (CETS No. 
124), merely regulates mutual State recognition of legal personality of NGOs in national law; see Wiederkehr 
(1987). 
23  For international NGOs at UN Conferences and ECOSOC, Willet acknowledges international personality in form 
of customary international law; Willets (2000: 205-206). 
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within that IO's legal order, NGOs see rights and duties attributed in only a limited fash-
ion and not in an all-embracing manner (in toto). We may thus conceive of those attrib-
utes as partial personality. A corollary of NGOs' functional personality – contrary to 
that of international organizations24 - finally is its missing objectivity, i. e. the absence 
of opposability erga omnes. This means that NGOs may enjoy personality merely with 
regard to the members of the respective IO's legal order. In order to benefit from it also 
in other circumstances, they would need to be recognized as subjects by the members of 
other international organizations or by other subjects of international law. In this way, 
NGO personality can only be relative25. A last question concerns the role of recogni-
tion of an individual NGO within an IO's legal order. In order to obtain relative person-
ality, does an NGO have to be recognized explicitly or implicitly by the IO in question 
(and/or its members) even though the selection criteria for acquiring a certain status are 
prima facie fulfilled? On the face of it, any single NGO attains legal status when the 
respective IO admits it to its legal order, mostly by majority vote through general ac-
creditation, by single case decisions or in the way its legal order foresees it. In this way, 
the corresponding IO's decision functions as an at least implicit recognition of an NGO. 
Beyond that, no additional recognition (e. g. by State members of the IO) seems to be 
required for rights and duties of an NGO to take effect. Thus, the old quarrel about the 
constitutive or declaratory function of recognition with regard to States in international 
law takes on another complexion here. For any single NGO, IO – but simply IO26 – 
recognition is constitutive for acquiring legal status at all. 
DO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ASSIGN LEGAL PERSONALITY TO 
NGOS? – A GRADUAL LEGAL APPROACH 
Since there is no general international law, i. e. treaty or customary law, detectable with 
regard to the legal status of NGOs, I propose to look at the rules concerning the rights 
and duties of NGOs and their legal situation in each international organization or treaty 
regime27 separately (Dahm, Delbrück et al. 2002: 238)28. As regards legal status within 
                                                 
24  See I.C.J. Reports 1949: 185. 
25  In this sense Mosler (1962: 32). 
26  Which, however, is substituted again by States in cases where we do not deal with an international organization in 
a legal sense; see note 27. 
27  For convenience, I only will speak of international organizations in the following, even though our case studies 
also encompass treaty regimes, State groupings, or organs/bodies (UN) and policy fields (EU) of international or-
ganizations. With regard to law-making power, this does not matter since for those cases which legally do not 
qualify as an international organization per se, State representatives which dispose of law-making power are the 
main actors. An exception constitutes the OSCE whose IO quality still is controversial, but whose documents also 
explicitly have only political, rather than legal value. 
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each organization/regime, I adopt a gradual approach which sets up different degrees of 
legal status depending on the number of criteria met. Even though I adopt a wide con-
cept of legal status encompassing all criteria discussed in the context of legal personal-
ity, I do not think that it does not matter to retain "de façon alternative, tel ou tel critère 
de dévolution" (Dupuy 2003: 266). Rather, empirical data suggest that the five legal 
criteria can be allocated to three groups of legal capacities which gradually increase the 
corresponding legal status. We start with simple rights and/or duties (first group), then 
add the capacity to enforce these rights and/or to be held accountable for the fulfilment 
of duties (second group), and finally deal with full normative powers (third group). 
These capacity groups differ with regard to the legal status they confer, the first group 
bestowing the status of "subject" on an NGO, the second conferring the status of "per-
son" to it, and the third being classified as encompassing "comprehensive legal status". 
The gradual approach as described above is illustrated in table 1 below. 
Table 1: Degree of Legal Status of NGOs According to Legal Criteria 
 Degree of 
Legal Status 
Criteria for 
Legal Status 
Corresponding Legal Rights and Obligations 
Subject Rights - Accreditation 
- Regular access to buildings 
- Right to have access to documents (background 
documents/policy papers) (distribution/Internet) 
- Access to governmental meetings 
- Right to speak 
- Right to submit documents 
- Special meetings for NGO consultation/obligatory 
consultation 
- Right to put topics on the IO's agenda 
- Rights in implementing projects (also financing) 
- Rights in review of projects 
- Control and monitoring of governments' compliance 
- Right to submit briefings in dispute settlement pro-
cedures between States or States and IOs 
 Duties - Duty to fulfil certain criteria for accreditation 
Person 
Enforcement 
Capacity 
- Right to lodge a complaint against IO or State 
 
Accountability 
- Accountability for loss of entitlement to be accred-
ited, checked through re-examination procedure 
- Accountability before Court 
- Accountability as part of national delegation or of 
organs with voting power 
Le
ga
l S
ta
tu
s 
Comprehensive 
Legal Status 
Normative 
power 
- Members of national delegations 
- Drafting rights 
- Right to vote  
                                                                                                                                               
28  I propose to approach each organization directly, i. e. through its own rules directly concerning rights and duties 
of NGOs, and not indirectly through any legal recognition of outside rules attributing NGO rights and duties or of 
rules elaborated by NGOs themselves which would acknowledge a certain - limited - normative power; see Pau-
welyn (2004). Referrals to other legal orders within the so-called "direct NGO rules" are taken into account. 
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The legal rights and obligations enumerated in column three are not exhaustive, but 
only a tentative list of common characteristics with regard to NGO rights and duties. 
They might be supplemented by others. However, the list indicates that the first group 
entails a far wider amplitude of different legal rights (and duties) than the second and 
third group, even though rights and duties of the two latter groups are more far-reaching 
in relation to their legal effects. Since legal status already can be achieved through the 
conferment of one single legal right or duty, it admittedly seems to be very easy to 
achieve subject status through one of the above listed rights or duties of the first cate-
gory. This, however, is a very low level of status. The threshold of person quality then 
would be at the level of enforcement capacity (second group). This procedure corre-
sponds to the approach taken with regard to individuals before the International Crimi-
nal Court was established. As the addressee of human rights norms, individuals usually 
were considered to acquire (limited) personality in international law only in those legal 
contexts where they could enforce their rights and duties (Dupuy 2003: 265-266). How-
ever, the threshold of person quality has to be investigated very carefully: When we 
speak of enforcement capacity and accountability, the corresponding capacity to act 
only makes sense when rights and obligations of NGOs are enforced, not duties of other 
subjects in international law. When Ipsen (2004: 93) requires controlling, monitoring 
and implementing rights for NGOs for any legal status to be acknowledged, he falsely 
misconceives that NGOs in these cases only enforce duties of States, and not their 
owns. For NGOs, these capacities equal to "simple" rights and duties. 
Another implication – evidenced through empirical research – which can be drawn 
from the table above is the under-representation of NGO duties. The debate on internal 
legitimacy of NGOs led in the scientific and political community alike might change 
this obvious bias in the near future. Until today, however, internal legitimacy of NGOs 
(rules about their establishment, internal organization, requirements for membership and 
members' rights, definition of an NGO, legal status, independence) mostly remains self-
regulatory, e. g. through codes of conduct (see Scholte 2004: 232). In some cases, inter-
national organizations even openly accredit NGOs which according to some others 
would not pass the line of legitimacy, e. g. when financed by governments29. 
Since I focus on the legal situation of NGOs in international organizations in general, 
in this study I exclude the attribution of personality to some specific and single NGOs, 
such as the Red Cross, which takes on a variety of functions under the four Geneva 
                                                 
29  See the UN ECOSOC criteria for accreditation which only require that financial contributions or other support, 
direct or indirect, from a Government shall be openly declared to the Committee through the Secretary-General 
and fully recorded in the financial and other records of the organization and shall be devoted to purposes in ac-
cordance with the aims of the UN; see below. 
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Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 to it (see Nowrot 1999: 
630-631). Another NGO, the International Olympic Committee, even has a good level 
of normative and jurisdictional power (Hobe 1997: 4). I moreover exclude those single 
NGOs which appear to act as the prolonged arm of State regulation, such as the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association (IATA)30. However, an effort is made to single out the 
first introduction of NGO rights and duties by year at every level in order to draw con-
clusions about when a certain legal status was conferred. Finally, since international law 
does not only relate to treaty, but also to customary law, I also include those legal rights 
and obligations relating to NGOs which seem to have acquired customary law status 
through practice and opinio iuris.  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN COMPARISON 
In the following, I will address the question of NGO legal status in international organi-
zations by grouping IOs alongside specific policy fields31. Thus, I broadly distinguish 
between Security (United Nations General Assembly (UN GA), United Nations Secu-
rity Council (UN SC), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
and European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU CFSP)), Economy 
(World Trade Organization (WTO), International Labour Organization (ILO), World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), G8, Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and 
European Union, Trade (EU Trade)), Environment (United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), Montreal Protocol, Aarhus Convention, Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), and European Union, Envi-
ronment (EU Environment)), Development (World Bank Group, United Nations De-
velopment Programme (UNDP), United Nations Economic and Social Council (UN 
ECOSOC), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United 
Nations Conferences (UN Conferences), and World Health Organization (WHO), Hu-
                                                 
30  It might remain open if this association better is denominated a "QUANGO" (Quasi-Non-Governmental Organi-
zations), e. g. a privately organized State administrative entity, or a business organization. 
31  This corresponds to the classification used in the project B5 of the Collaborative Research Center 597 "Transfor-
mations of the State" in Bremen. However, I do not evaluate the questionnaires on the UN Secretariat and on the 
EU Structural Funds. The first does not really fit in our policy fields (cross sectional area). The second does not 
rest on common legal rules at the European level with regard to participation of NGOs. Member States are free to 
organize NGO involvement (mainly in Monitoring Committees) and consequently participation depends on na-
tional rules and/or practice. A common European practice thus could only be reliably detected when more than 
two countries (Germany and Sweden) were to be analyzed. 
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man Rights (United Nations, Human Rights (UN Human Rights), and European Union, 
Asylum and Migration (EU Asylum and Migration)), and Financial Affairs (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank for International Settlements (BIS), European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB), and European Union, Economic and Financial Affairs (EU ECOFIN)). 
Table 2: Legal Status of NGOs within Different Organizations/Regimes 
Policy field 
Organizations/ 
Regimes 
Degree of Legal 
Status 
Intro-
duction 
Direct/Indirect  
Personality 
Intro-
duction 
UN GA Subject 1946 Indirect 1946 
UN SC Subject 1946 
Indirect 
Direct 
1946 
1996 
NPT Subject ? 
Direct 
Indirect 
? 
? 
NATO Subject ? Direct ? 
OSCE No status - - - 
Security 
EU CFSP Person 1993 Direct 1993 
WTO Subject 1995 
Direct 
Indirect 
1995 
1996 
ILO Comprehensive 1919 
Direct 
Indirect 
1919 
1919 
WIPO Subject 1970 Indirect 1970 
G8 No status - - - 
OECD Subject 1962 
Indirect 
Direct 
1962 
1997 
NAFTA Subject 1994 Direct 1994 
Economy 
EU Trade Person 1958 
Direct 
Indirect 
1958 
1958 
UNEP Subject 1988 Indirect 1988 
UNFCCC Subject 1994 
Direct 
Indirect 
1994 
1996 
Montreal Protocol Subject 1989 Indirect 1989 
Aarhus Convention Subject 2002 
Direct 
Indirect 
2002 
2002 
CITES Subject 1975 
Direct 
Indirect 
1975 
1975? 
Environment 
EU Environment Person 1987 
Direct 
Indirect 
1987 
1987 
World Bank Group 
Person 
Subject 
1993 
1944 ? 
Direct 
Indirect 
1993 
1993 
UNDP Person ? Indirect ? 
UN ECOSOC Person 1946 
Indirect 
Direct 
1946 
> 1946 
FAO 
Person 
Subject 
1957 
1953 
Direct 
Indirect 
1953 
1957 
UN Conferences Person 1950 
Indirect 
Direct 
1950 
> 1950 
Development 
WHO Person 1948 
Direct 
Indirect 
1948 
1948 
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Policy field 
Organizations/ 
Regimes 
Degree of Legal 
Status 
Intro-
duction 
Direct/Indirect  
Personality 
Intro-
duction 
UN Human Rights Person > 1946 
Direct 
Indirect 
> 1946 
1947 
Human Rights 
EU Asylum and 
Migration Person 1993 
Direct 
Indirect 
1993 
1999 
IMF Subject 1999 Indirect 1999 
BIS No status - - - 
ECB Person 1998 
Direct 
Indirect 
1998 
2004 
Financial  
Affairs 
EU ECOFIN Person 1958 
Direct 
Indirect 
1958 
?  
The table above shows the legal status acquired by NGOs in the different international 
organizations and the moment of introduction of that status32. Moreover, it is specified 
when direct (through primary international law) or indirect (through secondary interna-
tional law) personality was achieved33. In this context, we designate those rights/duties 
as conferring direct personality which directly are contained in international treaties34 or 
have developed into customary law out of soft law35, such as resolutions36, or out of 
other practice combined with opinio iuris. Indirect personality is based on internal deci-
sions, such as the Rules of Procedure of an organization. It is obvious that many organi-
zations grant a whole range of different rights and/or duties which – taken together – 
confer direct as well as indirect personality. Some reputed "rights" and "duties", how-
ever, do not confer any personality at all. This is the case when we deal with soft law 
(resolutions/guidelines, etc.) which either has not yet acquired the status of or cannot 
develop into customary law because State parties want to keep it non-binding. The 
OSCE constitutes a particular case in this context since all its documents do not have 
any legal, but only political value. However, since OSCE documents are framed in legal 
                                                 
32  Detailed tables per IO specifying every single right or duty at every level of legal status as well as its introduction 
can be obtained from the author. 
33  Wherever a question mark remains, the introduction of legal status or direct/indirect personality could not be 
identified. 
34  E. g., the UN's Art. 71 providing for ECOSOC that it "may make suitable arrangements" does not satisfy the 
requirement of direct introduction of NGO rights in treaty law. All further arrangements are contained in resolu-
tions and thus in secondary, not in primary international law; see also Nowrot (1999: 624). 
35  Here, the conferral of rights/duties does not take place immediately after the adoption of a certain soft law docu-
ment, but only within a certain time lapse. We therefore mark this by adding ">" before the year of introduction, 
which means "after" [year]. 
36  The question of whether resolutions of IOs might lead to internal or external custom over time has been decided 
in favour of external custom (= direct personality) in this case since the actors concerned (NGOs) in the resolu-
tions examined are not part of the organization itself. 
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language and express a clear opinio politica, we assume that they at least create soft 
law. Moreover, no personality is accorded by documents which do not contain any sort 
of international law because their authors do not have normative power in international 
law, such as rules or practice of experts or secretariats of international organizations. 
LEGAL STATUS AND TYPE OF PERSONALITY WITHIN DIFFERENT IOS 
Given the growth in literature on NGOs as new actors in international governance over 
the last 15 years, we would expect a corresponding increase in new NGO rights and 
duties during that time period. Since, on the other hand, governments are supposed to be 
unwilling to confer rights and duties, the hypothesis could be that subject status as well 
as indirect personality are preferred over person status or direct personality. The results 
of our enquiry, however, are astonishing. 
Of the 31 organizations examined, only three (BIS, G8, OSCE) confer no legal status 
at all to NGOs. Whereas within the OSCE this is due to the mere political value of its 
documents, the G8 and the Bank for International Settlements remain pretty closed pol-
icy circles not accessible to NGOs. On the other hand, only one organization, namely, 
the ILO, grants comprehensive status to NGOs also encompassing normative power. 
Most IOs thus accord either the status of subject or that of person to non-governmental 
organizations. The proportion yet is fairly balanced, with 14 IOs bestowing subject 
status, and 13 the qualitatively higher person status on NGOs. However, if we look 
closer at the results, we detect that the high person status result on the one hand is owed 
to equal results for all EU institutions. In the European Union (European Communities, 
EC), NGOs have had person status from the very existence of the EC due to introduc-
tion of direct rights to institute court proceedings. The time difference in introducing 
that status (column 4 of table 2) only depends on the moment of takeover of the respec-
tive policy field into Community/Union politics. On the other hand, the high person 
status result can be attributed to UN organizations working in the field of development 
or human rights. Apart from the World Bank Group, those IOs similarly conferred per-
son quality to NGOs already during the very first years of their existence, which was 
long before the 1990s. 
Hence, neither within the category of comprehensive, nor within that of person 
status, we could detect a meaningful increase of IOs granting such a status during the 
last 15 years. The ILO's tripartite structure already has been in existence since 1919. 
With regard to person status, we may consider the new EU policy fields (Asylum and 
Migration, CFSP, and the ECB). Apart from those, it was – unexpectedly – only the 
World Bank Group which upgraded NGO subject status – mainly characterized by the 
possibility to ask for implementation of projects and funding before – to person quality 
in 1993 through the establishment of a right to lodge complaints against the Bank for 
not following its operational policies and procedures before Inspection Panels of the 
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International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International 
Development Association (IDA). Since the year 2000, NGOs also can lodge complaints 
for being affected by the social and/or environmental impacts of projects before the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman Office of the International Finance Cooperation 
(IFC) or the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). A very new develop-
ment is the acceptance of the first amicus curiae briefs from civil society organizations 
by the tribunal of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) in May 2005. 
Within the category of subject status, the picture is somewhat different. Here, we 
have an increase of five organizations newly according status to NGOs, whereas for two 
(NATO, and the NPT), the moment of status introduction was not detectable. However, 
NATO is negligible since the only right NGOs have here is access to most of NATO 
documents. Those IOs which newly instituted NGO subject status encompass NAFTA 
(1994) and UNFCC (1994), the WTO (1995), the IMF (1999), and the Aarhus Conven-
tion (2002). In the case of the Aarhus Convention, NAFTA, UNFCC, and the WTO, 
however, this is due to the foundation of those treaty regimes or organizations. It should 
be mentioned that NAFTA also allows for amicus curiae briefs in some (chapter 11) 
cases, and, with regard to the North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion, for enforcement grievances through citizens' submissions. Similarly, the WTO 
provides for the possibility to submit amicus curiae briefs in WTO disputes to its Dis-
pute Settlement Panel or Appellate Body. At the IMF, rights remain pretty limited and 
do not go beyond access to some, mostly archived, information and consultation with 
regard to Member States' formulation of their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. 
Looking at the type of personality (direct or indirect), two-thirds (20) of all those in-
ternational organizations which confer legal status to NGOs do that through direct and 
indirect personality in parallel. Only six (the IMF, the Montreal Protocol, UNDP, 
UNEP, the UN General Assembly, and WIPO) restrict legal status to indirect personal-
ity, only two (NAFTA and NATO) to direct personality. Some of them (IMF, NATO, 
UN GA) only dispose of a pretty limited range of NGO rights anyway. However, the 
assumption that international organizations would prefer according indirect personality 
to NGOs instead of direct one has been refuted by the analysis. Thus, 22 IOs directly 
grant personality to NGOs through treaty or customary (primary) law, ten of them even 
before indirectly conferring personality through internal (secondary) rules, 7 others at 
least at the same time. Ten of those 22 organizations introduced direct status already 
before 1990, ten others afterwards37. Of the 26 organizations according indirect NGO 
status, even 15 organizations set up that status before 1990, and nine afterwards. Of 
                                                 
37  With regard to NATO and the NPT, an exact moment of status introduction could not be determined. 
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course, most of those last organizations or treaty regimes were new. Hence, the im-
mense increase in new rights for NGOs expected for the last 15 years does not seem to 
have taken place. Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that the moment of introduc-
tion of status does not shed light on the density of rights within an IO or the addition of 
new rights and duties where status already existed. This will be part of the analysis be-
low. 
Finally, if we look at the results from another angle, namely the different policy 
fields, we can draw the following conclusions. First, all IOs working in the policy fields 
of development and human rights confer person status to NGOs, and that mostly since 
the 1940s or 1950s. On the contrary, within the category of environment, a quite new 
policy field emerging only in the 1970s, NGOs mostly have subject status – in contrast 
to the widespread conviction that NGO participation in this field is especially effective. 
This is particularly remarkable since with regard to financial affairs, two of four organi-
zations (the ECB and EU ECOFIN) even grant person status to NGOs. For the other 
categories, status varies without demonstrating many similarities. One remark shall be 
added with regard to the EU: We have examined different policy fields, which makes 
sense when we look at the introduction of direct or indirect personality. At a first 
glance, NGOs in every policy field have person status from the moment of introduction 
of that subject area into EC/EU politics. There is no difference with regard to policy 
fields attributable to the first, second or third pillar. As mentioned above, this is due to 
NGO rights to introduce court proceedings. Those rights all are contained in treaty law 
and thus confer direct personality. However, as soon as we consider indirect personality, 
the picture is somewhat different. Here, we have to distinguish between the first pillar 
(EU Environment and EU Trade), and the second and third pillar (EU Asylum and Mi-
gration and EU CFSP), the first according indirect personality at the same time as direct 
one, and the second and third only at a later date38 or not at all. The same, however, ap-
plies to EU financial affairs. The ECB as well as EU ECOFIN were to some extent hesi-
tant to give way to indirect personality rights of NGOs. 
THE QUALITY OF RIGHTS 
The picture we get from table 2 is only a limited one. It only covers the final result of an 
addition of different rights and duties. Thus, as already mentioned above, no evidence is 
given of the extent, content, or breadth and density of rights and duties attributed to 
NGOs. This has to be part of a qualitative analysis which has to track down the com-
plexity of status by a combined approach of looking at the number and the substance of 
                                                 
38  The partial transfer of Asylum and Migration from the third to the first pillar in 1999 is reflected by introduction 
of indirect personality the same year. 
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NGO rights and duties39. As expected, the scale of NGO rights and duties varies exten-
sively from organization to organization. It ranges from one single right (NATO: access 
to documents) to an uncountable number of rights and duties in the United Nations hu-
man rights field. Those organizations which definitely grant the fewest rights enclose 
the ECB, the EU CFSP, EU ECOFIN, the IMF, NATO, the UN General Assembly, and 
the UN Security Council. Taken together with those IOs which do not confer any status 
to NGOs, namely the BIS, the G8, and the OSCE, this confirms our view of organiza-
tions in the field of security and financial affairs preferably working behind closed 
doors. In that category, we have organizations only allowing access to documents 
(NATO, UN GA), others also permitting some more information and consultation rights 
(IMF, UN SC)40, and finally the EU policy fields which add enforcement capacity to a 
few information rights (ECB, EU CFSP, EU ECOFIN)41. 
About half (17) of the organizations provide for accreditation and/or registration of 
NGOs42, most of them (15) also asking for the fulfilment of corresponding conditions. 
However, accreditation is only regularly re-examined in six cases (FAO, ILO, UN Con-
ferences, UN ECOSOC, UN Human Rights, and the WHO). Accreditation mostly leads 
to participation and speaking and/or submission rights. However, the possibility for 
NGOs having general consultative status to propose a topic for the agenda is unique at 
UN ECOSOC (and human rights bodies under ECOSOC). A curiosity is the Aarhus 
Convention's right for an NGO representative to participate in Bureau meetings as an 
observer. Moreover, voting power only is attributed to NGOs within the ILO. Almost 
all (2743) organizations allow access to undisclosed documents, whereas the ILO, and 
partly CITES, UNEP, UNFCCC, the Montreal Protocol, the WHO, and WIPO also dis-
tribute negotiation texts. An EU speciality is the right of every citizen of the Union, i. e. 
                                                 
39  A legal analysis in the end always remains a qualitative analysis, even though some quantitative measurements 
might be taken into account. 
40  IMF: access to documents, civil society newsletter, outreach seminars, consultation of NGOs in Member States' 
formulation of their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers; UN Security Council: online access to documents, NGO 
Working Group meetings meant to brief NGOs, submission of written NGO documents to the Council, and Aria 
Formula meetings allowing NGOs to brief the Council. 
41  In all three policy fields, NGOs have the right to receive an answer from an EU organ to a written request, to have 
access to unrestricted documents, which, however, often are restricted, and to submit complaints through the EU 
Ombudsman or to institute court proceedings. At the ECB, also open hearings within the framework of macro-
economic dialogue, social dialogue or public consultation take place. 
42  Aarhus Convention, CITES, FAO, ILO, Montreal Protocol, NPT, OECD, OSCE, UN Conferences, UNDP, UN 
ECOSOC, UNEP, UNFCCC, UN Human Rights, WHO, WIPO, and the WTO. 
43  Apart from the BIS, the G8, NAFTA, and the OECD. 
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also an NGO representative, to receive an answer to a written request from any EU in-
stitution or body (Art. 21 (3) of the EC Treaty). A similar provision of the UNDP Public 
Information and Documentation Disclosure Policy allows for reconsideration of a re-
quest for a document by the Public Information and Documentation Oversight Panel in 
case of a denial, in whole or part, of such a request. Project implementation through 
NGOs of course only is possible when an organization executes projects. The UN and 
the EU have set up a number of Trust Funds and grants for the implementation of their 
projects to which NGOs can apply. At the WHO, on the other hand, the part dealing 
with duties in this regard is especially strong: NGOs in informal and official relations 
with the WHO have to implement, formulate and to review certain projects. NGOs in 
official relations have to implement a programme of cooperation, have to inform on the 
WHO, and to collaborate in WHO programmes and with WHO Member States. Other-
wise, they loose their official status. UNFCCC formulates duties in a less binding way: 
its Guidelines for the participation of representatives of non-governmental organizations 
contain a sort of code of conduct for NGOs. 
Some IOs have set up specific advisory bodies in which NGO representatives partake 
exclusively or besides governmental members. Thus, NAFTA's North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation has instituted a Joint Public Advisory Com-
mittee, consisting of citizens appointed by governments. The EU disposes of a Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee (EESC)44 besides numerous advisory committees 
of the Commission. The UN human rights Treaty Bodies, the Permanent Forum on In-
digenous Issues, or the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, as many other 
bodies within the UN system, are expert member bodies. The UNDP CSO Advisory 
Committee, composed of 14 leaders of civil society organizations, gives NGOs the pos-
sibility to report on Parties' compliance to the UNDP Administrator through the Com-
mittee. Admittedly, this is the implicit claim which all NGOs assert with regard to most 
of their statements submitted to international organizations. But rarely there is an insti-
tutionalized monitoring mechanism authorized by an IO. Other compliance monitoring 
mechanisms exist within CITES, the ILO, and the OSCE. The Aarhus Convention has 
not yet legally concretized a similar right of the public, foreseen in Art. 15 of the Con-
vention, to be involved in reviewing compliance of States with the provisions of the 
treaty. 
More far-reaching rights of NGOs to be included in monitoring of State's compliance 
are complaint procedures. Here, we have to distinguish between the possibility to hand 
                                                 
44  The EESC's 317 members are drawn from economic and social interest groups in Europe. Members are nomi-
nated by national governments and appointed by the Council of the European Union for a renewable 4-years term 
of office. They belong to one of three groups: Employers, Employees, and Various Interests. 
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in amicus curiae briefs in dispute settlement procedures (NAFTA, WTO)45 or state-
ments in complaint procedures (ILO) between States on the one hand, and an effective 
enforcement right through becoming a party to a dispute before a court, tribunal or 
panel, etc. (EU, World Bank Group) or a complainant instigating a complaint procedure 
against a Member State (EU, ILO, NAFTA, UN Human Rights) on the other. The 
OECD has a complaint procedure against multinational enterprises through National 
Contact Points which accept comments and enquiries by NGOs. Similarly, the ICSID of 
the World Bank Group provides for the settlement of disputes between governments 
and foreign investors. In May 2005, the ICSID tribunal for the first time decided to ac-
cept amicus curiae briefs from five civil society organizations on the basis of Article 44 
of the ICSID Convention. Altogether, we detect a broad variety of NGO rights and du-
ties in different IOs. In a majority of those IOs, new rights were added over the last 15 
years and thus led to an intensified breadth and density of legal status. 
One last remark shall be allowed with regard to the density of NGO rights and duties 
in relation to the legitimacy of international organizations. As this chapter has revealed, 
extent and content of NGO legal status extensively differs from organization to organi-
zation. A comparison of two cases both attributing subject status, namely, NATO and 
the Aarhus Convention, one allocating just one single right to NGOs (NATO) and the 
other a palette of those rights and one duty to NGOs (Aarhus Convention), demonstrates 
to this (see tables 3 and 4 below). Obviously, in the case of NATO, it is questionable if 
we can still speak of sufficient safeguards for the legitimacy of international organiza-
tions. However, since NGO rights and duties are so different even in comparison of 
most-likely cases, such as the Aarhus Convention and, for example, human rights bod-
ies, I decline to draw any conclusions in relation to the sufficiency of those safeguards, 
be they rights or duties, for IO legitimacy. This should rather be examined together with 
the question of NGO actual impact and IO responsiveness to NGO claims, i. e. the fur-
ther criterion necessary for the legitimacy of international organizations. As argued 
above, legal status can only provide for minimal safeguarding clauses, not for the le-
gitimacy of international organizations itself. 
                                                 
45  At the UN's International Court of Justice, NGOs have only once participated in proceedings, namely the Interna-
tional League for the Rights of Man in the advisory opinion on the international legal status of South-West Af-
rica; see Nowrot (1999: 632). The Permanent Court of International Justice, however, allowed for NGO claims 
before the Court; see Martens (2003: 14). With regard to arbitration, the first case arbitrated by agreement be-
tween a State and an international NGO was the Arbitration between France and Greenpeace following the de-
struction of the Rainbow Warrior; see Nowrot (1999: 634). 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 38) 
- 22 - 
Table 3: Legal Status of NGOs within NATO 
NATO 
Criteria Legal Source 
Direct/Indirect 
Personality 
Content of Legal 
Rights/Obligations 
Chronological 
Introduction 
     
Rights Customary Direct Access to documents ? 
Result: Subject (?)/direct personality (?) 
Table 4: Legal Status of NGOs Attributed by the Aarhus Convention 
Aarhus Convention 
Criteria Legal Source 
Direct/Indirect 
Personality 
Content of Legal 
Rights/Obligations 
Chronological 
Introduction 
     
Art. 2 (4 and 5, 
and 10 (5 and 6) 
of the Conven-
tion;  
Rules 5 (2e and 
f), 6 (2), and 7 
(1 and 2) of the 
RoP 
Direct 
Right of environmental 
organizations to ask for 
registration as observers 
and to participate in meet-
ings/of members of the 
public to participate 
2001/2002 
Rules 5 (3), 10 
and 11 of the 
RoP 
Indirect 
Access to the provisional 
agenda and any support-
ing documents for ob-
servers at least six weeks 
before the opening of the 
meeting/access to all 
official meeting documen-
tation and the notification 
of any meeting through 
the ECE web site and 
upon request (electronic 
form sufficient).  
2002 
Rule 22 (2 and 
4) of the RoP Indirect 
Right to send an NGO 
representative to meetings 
of the Bureau 
2002 
Rule 27 (1) and 
(4) of the RoP Indirect 
Right of observers to 
speak 2002 
Rights 
Art. 15 of the 
Convention Direct 
Right of the public to be 
involved, potentially to 
submit communications, 
in reviewing compliance 
of States with the provi-
sions of the Convention 
Not yet legally 
concretized 
Duties 
Art. 2 (5), and 
10 (5 and 6) of 
the Convention; 
Rule 5 (2e) of 
the RoP 
Direct 
Duty to fulfil certain 
criteria for registration as 
observers 
2001/2002 
Result: Subject (2002)/direct (2002) and indirect (2002) personality 
OUTLOOK 
Our inquiry has looked at 31 IOs and their rules on NGO participation in detail. How-
ever, there are far more international organizations to be examined. An outlook of inter-
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esting cases to be examined shall be given in this section. Some of them seem to prom-
ise new and interesting mechanisms for NGO participation. For example, the Conven-
tion on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and Their Destruction of 1997 provides for a role of NGOs in the as-
sistance of the destruction of anti-personnel mines. The International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
similarly contain implementation rights for NGOs. Moreover, there are far more organi-
zations and treaty regimes extending rights in complaint procedures or court proceed-
ings to NGOs, either as petition or amicus curiae briefing rights46 or in the form of real 
enforcement power granting party status to NGOs47. In some cases, accredited NGOs 
can even request interpretation of treaty rules48. 
Yet, if we want to find genuine NGO membership, we often have to leave classical 
governmental cooperation through international organizations or treaty regimes. An 
exception is the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) which grants private 
organizations sector membership. Apart from this, we find membership rights in inter-
agency cooperation (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)/UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) or hybrid network organizations, 
such as the World Commission on Dams (WCD) or the International Union for Conser-
vation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). The Agreement Establishing the Inter-
national Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) provides for associate 
membership with limited voting rights for NGOs besides full membership of govern-
ments and inter-governmental organizations parties to the Agreement. In some of those 
cases (IUCN/WCD), however, it is questionable if the organizations concerned can con-
fer status in international law to NGOs given the non-binding character of cooperation 
not dominated by governments49. In "classical" intergovernmental cooperation, invita-
                                                 
46  Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints (Council of 
Europe), African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Union (AU)), American Convention 
on Human Rights (Organization of American States (OAS)), and (European) Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Council of Europe). In the case of the European Social Charter itself, 
NGO participation is foreseen with regard to the governmental reporting mechanism. Protocol No. 2 amending 
the European Charter of 1991, which is not yet in force, will expand NGO involvement in this supervision, espe-
cially at an early stage. 
47  Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints and (Euro-
pean) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (both Council of Europe). 
48  African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (both AU). 
49  In the case of the IUCN, e. g., governments transferred bureau duties to IUCN under the Ramsar Convention on 
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tion to Executive Committees or Boards (United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR)/United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)/World 
Food Programme) seems to be the utmost. The United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA) allows members of its NGO Advisory Committee to participate in Executive 
Board meetings as observers. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization's (UNESCO) Constitution – which in its first draft in 1944 had foreseen 
membership of individuals serving in their personal capacity and participation of educa-
tors, similarly to the ILO structure – provides for collaboration with national educa-
tional, scientific and cultural institutions preferably through National Commissions 
which serve in an advisory capacity to their respective governments. Moreover, the 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
makes arrangements for an advisory function of some NGOs to the World Heritage 
Committee. Besides, we only find accreditation and registration of NGOs as observers 
(African Union (AU)/Organization of American States (OAS)). Some headquarter 
agreements confirm the status given to NGOs by a certain IO through expanding protec-
tion to them50. 
CONCLUSION 
Globalization has led to changes in statehood which also have a bearing on international 
politics. This paper has started out from the premise that legal personality of NGOs 
could function as a minimal safeguarding clause for overcoming the legitimacy deficit 
of international organizations. If NGOs had a certain legal status in international law, it 
was assumed that some minimal preconditions for legitimate governing might be guar-
anteed. Our inquiry arrives at the conclusion that in the majority of cases, IOs do confer 
legal personality to NGOs, mostly in form of subject or person status. Moreover, they 
predominantly have done so from the early days of their existence. Changes in status 
over the years from non-status to subject status or from subject status to person status 
are rare and did only take place within four organizations (FAO, IMF, UNEP, and 
World Bank). The other IOs which newly introduced NGO status were new organiza-
tions or regimes. However, the latter do not seem to be as willing to accord person 
status – instead of subject status – as were the IOs founded after World War II. Fur-
thermore, IOs did not and do not make a substantial difference between direct or indi-
rect personality and often accord both. Thus, IOs generally seem to be quite sympathetic 
                                                                                                                                               
Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat. We can thus observe the reverse proce-
dure of conferring rights to the IUCN through governments. 
50  Thus, the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of 
the United Nations protect NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC from any impediments to transit to or from 
the headquarters district; see GA Res. 169 (II) of 31 October 1947. 
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to according legal personality to NGOs – and direct and indirect personality alike –, but 
remain pretty static with regard to the status model once chosen – with a declining affin-
ity of new organizations to introducing person status. The factor, however, which makes 
the difference is the quality of rights. Over the past 15 years, rights and duties of NGOs 
have increased significantly in a majority of IOs, even though NGO duties still remain 
under-represented. Altogether, this has led to an increasing breadth and density of NGO 
legal personality which might be capable of absorbing some of the critics with regard to 
the legitimacy deficit of international organizations. The safeguards are there and have 
been consolidated – the question whether public opinion will expect a large upgrading 
of NGO status by IOs remains to be seen. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
A.  Journals and Terms 
Art. ..............................................Article 
AVR ............................................Archiv des Völkerrechts 
CETS...........................................Council of Europe Treaty Series 
CSO............................................. civil society organization 
I.C.J. Reports...............................Reports of the International Court of Justice 
IO ................................................ international organization 
IR................................................. International Relations 
NGO............................................ non-governmental organization 
QUANGO ...................................Quasi-Non-Governmental Organization 
Res...............................................Resolution 
ZaöRV.........................................Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 
B.  Organizations, State Groupings, Treaty Regimes, and their Organs and Policy Fields 
AU...............................................African Union 
BIS ..............................................Bank for International Settlements 
CITES..........................................Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Flora and Fauna 
EC................................................European Communities 
ECB.............................................European Central Bank 
EESC...........................................European Economic and Social Committee 
EU ...............................................European Union 
EU Asylum and Migration .........European Union, Asylum and Migration 
EU CFSP .....................................European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy 
EU ECOFIN................................European Union, Economic and Financial Affairs 
EU Environment..........................European Union, Environment 
EU Trade .....................................European Union, Trade 
FAO............................................. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
G8................................................Group of Eight 
IATA ........................................... International Air Transport Association 
IBRD ........................................... International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ICSID .......................................... International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
IDA.............................................. International Development Association 
IDEA ........................................... International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
IFC .............................................. International Finance Cooperation 
ILO.............................................. International Labour Organization 
IMF.............................................. International Monetary Fund 
ITU.............................................. International Telecommunication Union 
IUCN........................................... International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Re-
sources 
MIGA .......................................... Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
NAFTA .......................................North American Free Trade Agreement 
NATO..........................................North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPT .............................................Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
OAS.............................................Organization of American States 
OECD..........................................Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OSCE ..........................................Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
UN...............................................United Nations 
UNAIDS...................................... Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
UN Conferences ..........................United Nations Conferences 
UNDP..........................................United Nations Development Programme 
UN ECOSOC ..............................United Nations Economic and Social Council 
UNEP ..........................................United Nations Environment Programme 
UNESCO.....................................United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNFCCC.....................................United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNFPA........................................United Nations Population Fund 
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UN GA ........................................United Nations General Assembly 
UNHCR.......................................United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UN Human Rights.......................United Nations, Human Rights 
UNIDO........................................United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
UN SC.........................................United Nations Security Council 
WCD ...........................................World Commission on Dams 
WHO ...........................................World Health Organization 
WIPO ..........................................World Intellectual Property Organization 
WTO............................................World Trade Organization 
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